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THE OUTLOOK FROM THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS
OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES IN
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
By ERNEST C. CARIAN*

T HE present legal status of employers and employees in industrial disputes is mosi understandable through a study of the
historical development of this branch of the law which, oddly
enough, has always been closely associated with the law relative
to monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and commerce.
In early England monopolies were, by common law, contrary
to public policy' and illegal unless permitted by special franchise';'
and the creation of a monopoly was punishable whether achieved
by combined action or individual effort.'
From the earliest times, it was unlawful and criminal in England for several persons to combine for the purpose of controlling
trade or enhancing prices,' and all contracts or arrangements in
restraint of trade or labor were held unenforceable because contrary to public policy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the first labor unions in
England (organized about 1720 A. D.) were held to be criminal
*Of the Minneapolis Bar.

'Case of Mo;apolies, (i6oi) ii Coke 84b; Darcy v. Allen (i6oi) ii
Coke 84b.
'London's Case, (i5go) 5 Coke 126; Y. B. ii Hen. VI, ig; Fitzwalter's
Case, (1685) 3 Keb. 242; Fermor v. Brooke, (1590) Cro. Eliz. 203.
'4 Bacon Abr. 335a; Hawkins, P. C. c. 80; Rex v. Waddington, (z8ox)
i East 143.

"Lombard's Case Lib. Assiz. 276 P1. 38; Anonymous (1700) i2 Mod.
248; Rex v. Cambridge Jotrneymen-Taylors, (1721) 8 Mod. io; 5 and 6
Edw. VI. c. 14.
• "Y. B. 2 Hen. V. f. 5, p1. 26; Jelliet v. Broad, (16ms) Noy 98; Clay-

gate v. Latchelor, (16ox) Owen 143; Clerke v. Comer, (z735) Cas. t.
Hardw. 53.
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conspiracies# not because labor had begun to organize against
capital, but because "combinations of this nature, whether an the
part of the workmen to increase, or of the masters to low"r, wages
were equally illegal,',
And so, at the outset of the contest between employers and
employees boih got an equal start; combinations of the one to
lower or of the other to raise wnges were first declared illegal, not
to aid or deter the particular disputants in their quarte, but to
protect the public against monopolistic control of labor and the obstruction of trade and commerce, The rights of the public; as the
innocent bystander, were recognized by the common law as paramount from the very beginning.'
In the combat itself, labor scored first, Statutes were enacted
legalizing labor unions in England and declaring that neither employers nor employees should be punished for any agreement relating to wages or hours of labor, but expressly prohibiting endeavors by either employers or employees to affect wages or hours
of labor by "force, threats, intimidation, molestation, or obstrucDuring the hundred )ears that have passed since the enactment
of the statute legalizing labor unions in England, the struggle between employer and employee has progressed there much the sa ne
as in the United States. But, with admirable consistency, the English courts have adhered to the common law (as respects both employer and employee) except when authorized or required to'depart therefrom by acts of parliment." Under such policy proggress in the struggle between emplkyer al employee may have
been slower in England than in the United States, but the legal
rights of the combatants have been huch more clearly defined in
'Rex v, Cambride Jnurnqen.TaylorS, (s7z:) 8 Mod, it; Rex v.
6 Durn,. & Eat 6g; 3 Columbia Law Review 447.
Mawby, (zj7)
'Hilton Y.Edcersley, (A56) 6 E. & B. 47 , , 2 Jur. N. S. 587,
25 L J. Q. B. 19%g
'Some authorities have mistakenty denied that the English "common
law was opposed to labor unions, and have attributed the earl, decisions
against labor unions to vry ancient English statutes for the enslavement
of labor in the days of serfdbn. In iupport of this view, see Statute of
dI, and 25 Edw. II, stat. i; 2 &3 Edw, VI, ch.
Labourers,23 Edw. III,&
35; 5 Efi:. Ch. 4.
. T., 29
6 o.
'St. $ GM IV, t, 4 (jun 2t, 1&.) Amended b3Y
(July 6A1825).

358.

"L4yons Y.Wilins, (1896) a Chi. 8it, 65 L. J. Ch. Ooa, 74 L . X. S.
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England-probably to the advantage of both parties as well as the
public at large."
Prior to the enactment of the first English statute legalizing
labor unions, the American courts had approved and followed the
English common law doctrine."' After the orderly change of the
law by statute in England, the courts of the several common"The Trade Union Act of 187 (St. M & 35 Viet. c. 31, as amended by St. 39 & 40 Viet. C. 22), gave 1;bor unions a definitely lawful status
within the limits therein set forth. The Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vicet. c. 86) expressly legalized an agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be done
any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between em.
ployers and workmen which might lawfully be done by one person acting
alone; but this act also expressly made it illegal for any person, with a
view to compelling another person to do or abstain from doing any lawful act, (a) to use violence or intimidate such other person or his wife or
children or injure his property, or (b) persistently follow such other person from place to place, or (c) hide tools or property owned or used by
such other person or deprive him or hinder him in the use thereof, or '(d)
watch or beset the house or other place where such other person resides
or works or carries on business or happens to be, or the approach to such'
house or place, it being provided, however, thar attending at or near the
house where a person resides, or carries on business, or works, or the upproach to such house or place, in order merely to obtain or Communicate
information, should not be deemed unlawful.
The Judicature Acts authorized the courts to issue interlocutory injunctions to prevent the destruction of a business or industry through
violation of the above mentioned statutes pending settlement of trade dis.
putes in or out of court.
I Therefore .when the case of Lyons v. Wilkins, U1896] I Ch. Six, 65
L. J. Ch. toi, 74 L. T. N. S. 358 arose, the Court of Appeal was able to
decide quite clearly that striking employees of a leather goods manufac.
turer were within their rights in combining to strike, in assisting each
other in supporting themselves for that purpose and deriving support from
other trade unions, and in picketing the employer's place of business for
the purpose of peacefully communicating to others (whether seeking employment or not) the information that such strike was in progress; but
that such striking employees were acting unlawfully in picketing the employer's place of business for the purpose of accosting employees or persons
seeking employment and handing them cards reading: "You are hereby requested to abstain from taking work from Messrs. Lyon & Sons", and in
calling out on strike the employees of one Shoenthal (who had no quarrel
with their employer) in order to compel Shoenthal to cease and desist from
making partly finished articles, pursuant to contract, for Lyon & Sons,
one of the parties to the trade dispute.
Contrast the clearness of this decision with the confusion and uncertainty of judge-made law in the United States up to the same date; and
with the uncertainty of such late American statutes as the Clayton Act,
construed by a divided court in the Duplex Printing Case, (1921) 254 U.
S.443, 6s L. Ed. x6, 41 S, C. R. 172. An element of uncertainty in English law, however, has been'injected by the Trades Disputes Act, 6 Edw.
VIT. C.47, as interpreted in Conway v. Wade, igo l A. C. So6, and Larkin
v. Long, 19i5] A. C. 814 when compared with Hodges v. Webb, ErgOol
2 Ch. 70.
"People v. Fisher, (183S) 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 9, 28 Am. Dec. Sot; PeoplC v. Melvin, (18o) 2 Wheeler C. Cas (N.Y.) 262, Yates Set. Cas. 132;
24 Cyc. 818, Note to.
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wealths in the United States undertook to achieve the same result
by judicial legislation under the guise of modernizing the English
common law to meet the needs of our changed conditions in this
new country." The result has been confusion indescribable-such,
indeed; that no lawyer could safely advise as to the legal rights of
employers or organized employees in any state if there had been
a change in the personnel of its court of last resort since the latest
decision on the subject.
Confusion in the law of the several states has increased, not
alone frown the divergence of opinion among judges, but also fron
the enactment of legislation both directly and indirectly affecting
the combatants.
Much of tile legislation affecting employers has been indirect
and generally aimed at the correction of abuses by capital in many
ways, incidentally including unfair treatment of employees ;" but
nearly all legislation affecting employees or organized labor has
been passed for specific purposes directly involving the status of
labor."
The struggle between employers and employees in the United
States has been formnidable only (luring the past fifty years. For
within that time the development of industry has incidentally produced the sweatshop with its long hours, low wages, anl unfit environnient as the crowning evil (front the viewpoint of labor) of
the industrial system; while, to combat the sweat shop, labor
"Campare early decisions such as State v, Stewart, 0887) 59 Vt. 27,3,

1)Ali. 559, 59 Am. Rep. 710; State v. Glidden, (1886) 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl.
890o, 3 A. S. R. ,3; State v. Donahlson, (1867) 32'N. J. L. 151, 155, go
Am. Dec. 64t); Carew y. Rutherford, (187o) ioo Mass. 1,8 Am. Rep. 287,
with later decisions such as National Protective Association v. Cumming,

(zgo) flo N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369, j8 L. It. A. 1.15, 88 A. S. R. 648;
Gray v. Iluilding Trades Council, (i9o3) 9! Minn. 171, 97 N. NV. 663, 63
L. R. A. 753, 1o3 A. S. R. 477,
1
"The Sherman Act of July 2, i8go, eh. (q7,-,6 Slat, 1. --o9, and the antitrust acts of marly states have been variously interpreted, not only as generally prohibilting trusts, monopolies and agreements in restraint of trade

hsy either employers or employees, but also as prohibiting blacklists of employers (Lawlor v. Loewe, (1915) 235 U. S. 522, 59 L. Ed. 34Y, 35 S. C.

and, presumably, of employees. Other legislation indirectly affecting
the rights of employer and employee includes the maintenance of fire es-

:7o)

capes, guards for machinery, sanitary equipment, methods of work, and a

multitude of other matters having to do with the social and economic side
of industry in its relation to the community rather than the direct relalions between employers and employees.
'iMhe various Trade Union Acts (e. g. 24 Stat. 1.. 86), aiti-injunctilon
acts (e. g. 38 Slat. L. 738; Session Laws .Minnesota 1017, ch. 493),'antiblacklisting acts (e. g. G. S. 'Min, 1913, sec. 8Sqo), minimum wage acts,

acts lihiiting hours of employment, and many others, hear the unmistakable label of legislation enacted by procurement of organized labor.
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unions within the siame period have become thoroughly and efficiently organized, and with their constantly increasing and often
unreasonably extreme demands have become (from the viewpoint
of capital) the greatest menace to ,industrial development.
Except within the last decade, employers have operated behind closed doors, silently and secretly exerting their power in a
multitude of ways to combat legislation or evade laws directed
against monopoly, unfair trade, competition, undue profits and
other evils detrimental to the public at large, with the labor problen merely incidental to the much more general combat between
the few who fain would control everything on the one side and
all the rest of the people fighting for a livable distribution of
wealth on the other.
But organized labor, in the very nature of things, always has'
been compelled to operate in the open-in fact to advertise itself
noisily to gain strength and support; and, while at times this has
put employees at a disadvantage, it has in a general way worked
for their benefit because public opinion has been thereby enlisted
in their support whenevet their cause was just.
The weapons of the emlifioyers have been the nc from time
out of mind-the replacement of dissatisfied labor with other
workmen content with (or forced by circumstances to accept)
the employers' ternis and conditions of employment or, in the al-'
ternative, the supression of the business or industry involved in
the dispute. In the use of these weapons, employers have been
aided by their organizations for production in widely separated
areas supplentenied (until recently, at least) by an efficient transportation system whereby the economic demand for their products
could be satisfied despite local disturbances; and also by the
thousand and one other advantages, legitimate and illegitimate, in-'
cident to the possession of great wealth and the private control of
large properties.
The first weapon used by enployees wits the simple strike, or
combined refusal to work, which has been generally held to be
legal in the United States froi an early date; the decisions resting upon the absolute constitutional right of the individual to work'
or not to work at his pleasure and without assigning any reason
tlierefor, suppletimented by the American common-law right of
such individuals to combine and do together what each may lawfully do separately."'
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The simple strike, however, was often ineffective; and that explains why the whole history of organized labor in the last fifty
years might be written merely by tracing its development and use
of other weapons added to tile simple strike to fight its battles
with the employers.
One of the first additions to the strike for direct redress of
grievances was the further refusal of union labor to work in the
same place of emloyment with non-union labor. There followed
a wide difference of judicial opinion as to the legality of such concerted action by employees, but finally the view prevailed that
since an individual has an'absolute right to refuse to work in a
particular place because another employee is objectionable to him,
a number of individuals may collectively refuse to work in such
place for the same reason;" hence labor unions may mquire their
"Commonwealth v. lhmt, (1842) 4 Aldetc, (Mass.) lit, 38 Am. Dec.
346; Randall v. Hazleton, (i866) iz Allen (Mass.) 412, 414; Vegelahn v.
Guntner, (1896) 167 1Mass. 92, 44 N. E. io77, 3s L, R. A. 722, 57 A, S. R.

4.1j, where Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, said: "But there is a
notion, which latterly has been insisted on a good deal, that a combination
of persons to do what any one of them lawfully might do by himself will
make the otherwise lawfl conduct unlawful. It would be rash to say that
some as yet unformulated truth may not be hidden under this proposition.
But, in the general form in which it has been presented and accepted by
many courts, I think it plainly untrue, both on authority and on principle. , . . One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most lie can for his services,
and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services
for the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and
powerful. Combination on the .other is the necessary and desirable
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way."
The legality of strikes was also declared by Justice Holmes to be based
upon the doctrine that free competition is worth more to s6ciety than ;t
costs, and that "the policy is not limited to struggles between persons
of the same class, competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts
of temporal interests."
This doctrine, however, cuts both ways when considered with reference
to the present-day attempts of union labor to destroy the free competition of non-union labor (or "outlaw" labor organizations) with them in
the labor market. And this, notwithstanding the declaration of some late
statutes that "labor is not a commodity ;" for competition in the struggle
for life is not confined to an interchange of commodities,
Moreover, the right to act in concert has been frequently declared dependent upon an absence of malice and the presence of justifiable selfinterest. In National Protective Ass'n v, Cumming, (19oa) 17o N, Y. 31S
63 N. E. 369, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 A. S. R. 64$, Chief Justice Parker said:
"Workingmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing
higher wages, shorter hours of labor, or improving their relations with
their employers. They have the right to strike (that is, to cease working
in a body by prearrangement until a grievance is redressed), provided the
object is not to gratify malice or inflict injury upon others, but to secure
better terms of employment for themselves."
trades Council, (1903) 91 'Minn. 171, 97 N. W, 663.
v. Building
6j "Gray
L. RI. A.
753, 103 A. S. R. 477; National Protective Association v.
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tnembers not to work where non-union labor is employed. The
courts were very reluctant to establish this doctrine; it was rigidly
confined, and its legality was made to depend upon the mnotives of
the union or combination rather than upon the effect produced. If
the object was to force a' employer to unionize his business," or
coerce workmen to join the union,"' or induce employees to break
an existing contract," or intimidate persons seeking employment,"
or deprive a non-union man of his opportunity to work," or maliciously injure anyone, then the agreement in combination to quit
work for such purposes was an unlawful conspiracy. These limitations upon the right of employees to combine to quit work were
of little practical use either to non-union workmen or employers,
since proof of the mwlives actuating union labor in any particular
contest was very difficult, if not impossible.
The employers, therefore, retaliated by forming organizations
among themselves and agreeing not to employ laborers who had
gone on strike or left the employment of any member employer,
and agreeing further to discharge union employees and to prevent
Cummings (:goe) q7a N. Y. 35 63 N. E. 369, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 A. S. t
648 where Justice Parker stated the prevailing view in these words:
"Stated in other words, the propositions quoted recognize the right of
one man to refuse to work for another on any ground that he may regard
as
sufficient,
employer
has no to
right
demand agiving
reason
for it.
a reasn,
the toemployee's
legal objection
it, no
takethe
there is, and
But
if he has one and the fact that the reason given is that he refuses to
whether
organization,
hsright
a member
notdoes
ihoorisnot,
work
nor
to stop work;
not affectofhis
employer
stated toithhisaothr
beobjects
he
does it give a cause of action to the workman to whom
men
of
body
a
to
oplies
rule
some
e
of the
causethetheservices
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sees objector.he
fit to discharge the man objected to, rather than
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more be
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may nodeemed
Tht reason
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titan of an individual."
dIaion
the oroan
6.
"OBrenv. People (igo5) s:6 Ill. 354, 75 N. IL o8, xo8 A.L.S.R.itA. 339,
5i
"Plant v. Woods, (i89) xyb Mass. 49, 57 N, 13, ot,
88 Mass. 353, 74 N. IL 6o3, s
79gA. S. lt.o33erry v. Donovan, (io)
L. R.A. (N.S.) Bo, oB A. S. R. 49g; Erdman v. Mitchell, (93) 27 Pa.
sb Al. 327, 6jL. R. A. j4, 99 A. S. R. 783; Crran v. Galen, (8g7)
y R,
N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. a97; Old Dominion Steamship Co., v. McKenna
152 L
"All
(88) 8f Fed. 48, 5o, 8 Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) s where it was said:
to become
or
i
workmen
coerce
to or
designed vex
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them
and
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interfere
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J. Eq. 75, 53 AtI.
Cassidy, (9ow) 63 N.
3"Jersey City Printing Co. v. (1g6)
N. . 76; Everett
77
355,
11.
220
People,
v.
Union
"Franklin
(:go6) os Va. 88, 53
v, Richmond
Waddey
Fed. 748.
Rune, (z88S) 23Union,
States v, Tpographcal
United
S. E. a73;Co.
396, 6 Ad. 505, 19
Md.
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non-union employees from joining any labor union tnder penalty
of discharge. As a means of accomplishing these purposes, the
employers circulated "blacklists" of former employees under the
ban for striking or joining labor unions
Employees sought to prevent employers from using such weapon, but the courts held that inasmuch as an employer has an absolute right to employ or to refuse to employ or to discharge from
employment any person, for any reason or for no reason at all, it
follows that any number of employers may lawfully organize for
the same purpose, and may by mutual agreement discharge any
employee or refuse to employ any person belonging to a labor
union; and as a condition of employment may require any workman to sign a contract agreeing not to leave work because of the
employment of non-union workmen in the same industry or place

of work; and, further, that such organized employers may keep
and circulate (among members of the organization, at least) a list
conltaining the names of former employees who have quit work
or have been (ischargcel for any of the reasons above enumerated"
Organized labor then procured the enactment of statutes in
many states prohibiting and penalizing the refusal to employ men
or the, discharge of employees because of their membership in
labor unions, and prohibiting the circulation of "blacklists" of discharged workmen ;' but these statutes have been declared unconstittitional in their main provisions," although some of the provi"Worthington v. Waring, (189a) 157 Mass., 421, 32 N. E. 744, 20 L.

It. A. 342, is one of the leading cases involving employers blacklists of
employees, aud denying employees the use of the injunction to prevent
*amne.

"Boyer v. Wcstern Union Telegraph Co., ('goi ) x24 Fed. 246; Worth-

W;
KR
N. E.
157 Mass.
Waring, (1892)
ington
717,A,where
WV.
lI9g2oN. L,
768,,744,
fot32Neb.
(igz8)421,
of Labor,
State .v.Employers

and agree
cease
to combine
employees
the
may legally
employers
otherofhand,
theright
said; "Onthe
body, discussing
in a alter
workcourt,
much
as
have
They
purpose,
that
for the 'closed shop' principle or may
with
advisethat
not adopt
will other
theyeach
cou1sel
eachorother
with
legal right to refuse to employ members of labor unions as such members
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legalCo.right
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shop', andCoal
an 'openMitchmnan
to work
to ref'use
y. Mitchell,
& Coke
in inConcert.
of conduct
ahave
course
Martin, Modern
(1917) 2450U, S. 229 6a L. Ed. a6o, 38 S. C. KL 6.....
Law of Labor Unions, Sec. 270."
June 1, :898, 30 Stat. L. 424, toh. 370 and 0. 5. Minn, :913, Sec..
typical.
are of
SadoAct
-"0Coppage v. Kansas, (14) 236 U. S. I, 59 L. Ed. 44, 35 S. C. A. 24o;
Adair v. United States, (go8) 208 U. S. :6:, 53 L. E.d. 436. a8 S. C. R,
77; State v. Daniels, (igia) x8 Minn. 155, 136 N. V,584; State v. Julow,
(1895) 129 lo, 163, 3! . V7! People v, Marcus, (19o6) x8s N. Y.
'si, 7 N. E. io07; Gillespiev. People, (19oo) 188 III. 176, 58 N. E. wOOr;
Stce v. Krentzberg, (1902) 114 Wis. 530, go N. XV. zogS.
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sions against blacklisting discharged workmen may still be in,
forceY Organized labor has a corresponding right to keep and
circulate (among its own members, at least) lists of employers
who have discharged union laborers or are otherwise hostile to
them. But this limited right of employers and employees to blacklist each other must not be confused with bayeo tlin, which is quite
another thing.?
Organized labor had now established the right in concerteid action to quit work together (i. e. strike) not only fdr the direct purpose of forcing an increase in wages or an improvement in working conditions for the icnbcrs of the union, but also for the indirect purpose of excluding non-union workmen from participat'State v.Justus, (1902) 8s Minn. 779, 88 N. W. 759; Dick v. North-

ern Pacific Ry. Co., (197o) 86 Wash, 2a, 15o Poe. 8; Joyce v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., (19o7) 1oo MUM. 2;4, i1o N. W. 975; Heffernan v.
Whittlesey et a]., (1914) j. Minn, 63, 148 N. V. 63, where it was said:
"if the evidence sustained the charge of a conspiracy betweeh the company and Whittlesey to make false charges aginst plaintiss integrity in
order to procure his discharge, resulting in his being 'blacklisted', it is
probable that there would be'a liability." In State v. Moilen, (1918) 140
Minn. 13*, j67 N. W. 345, Chief.Justice Brown said in reference to earlier
legislation affecting employers and employees: "The so-called hlacklistlog of employees by employers \as prohibited, and the statute was sustained in State v. Justus, (9o2) 8s Minn, 279, 88 N. W. 759. . . . A
statute prohibiting the malicious interference by combination of employers to prevent a discharged. employee from obtaining employment elsewhere, was upheld in Joyce v. Great Northern' Ry. Co., (i9o7) zoo Minn.
2;5, io N. W. 975." See also authorities cited and discussed in Notes
6a L. R.A,714, ig L. R; A. (N.S.) 561, 27 L. R.A. (N.5j)66,48 L. R; A;

(N.S.) 893.

These decisions indicate that the right to blacklist will be closely
confined to the original combatants, and not extended beyond the reasoning of the cases of State v, Employers of Labor (gt8) 102 Neb. 768, 19
N. W. 717, and Hitchman Co. v. Mitchell, (9175 24s U. S.2a9, 63 L. Ed.
20o 38 S. C., R.6. Indeed, in these decisions the courts seem to have
avoided the term "blacklist", although recognizing the validity of acts
amounting to the same thing.
"Rogers v. Evarts, (i89i) 17 N. Y. S. 264; Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, (1894) 77 Hun (N. Y.) 21S, 28 N. Y. S. 321, 59 N. Y. St.
Rep. 5o3; Note to Hey v. Wilson, 16 L. R.A. (N.S.) 85, where there is
a discussion of many decisions which apparently assumed the right of a
labor union to post or list an employer not only as unfit for union laborers to work for, hut also as not meriting the patronage of members of the
union in the sale of hliproducts-the only doubt expressed having to
do with the right to circulate "Unfair'Lists," etc. among tidrd persns,
thereby instituting a boycott. See also Note to Wilcutt v. Driscoll, 23 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1237, and Mlontgomery Ward v. S. D. Mferch. Ass'n, (1z07)
15o Fed. 413.

"Lawlor v. Loewe, (i9g5) 235 U, S. sfa, j9 L.Ed. 341 35S, C. R.370,
shows that the circulation by organized labor of ; list of "unfair dealers" among propective customers of such dealers is prohibited by the
Sherman Anti-trust Act (26 Stat. L., 2o), if it is intended to and does
restrain commerce among the states.
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ing in the benefits so procured, through being employed in the
same place of work with union labor-for such was the undoubted
cause of the refusal of union labor to work alongside non-union
workmen.
Thus far all was well. Employers might, as they saw fit, either
fill their place entirely with union laborers bound together by common ideals and standards, or with non-union workmen entirely
unorganized; and employees might elect to work in the one kind
of place or the other.
The next step, however, in the progress of union labor was an
attempt to prevent employers from hiring non-union workmen tw
work in places from Which union labor, for its own reasons, had
withdrawn; and the weapon first adopted by union labor to accomplish such object was picketing the place of employment.
With the advent of picketing another confusing difference of
judicial opinion arose. At first the tendency of the courts was to
declare all picketing illegal;" but this attitude was gradually dissipated and supplanted by the present prevailing view that there
is no illegality, at*common law, in the act of several persons stationing themselves near a particular place (i. e. the place 6f former
employment of striking workmen) for the purpose of observing
and obtaining information or communicating facts concerning
such place to persons willing to receive the same, or "peacefully
persuading" persons to desist from working therein if such persons are willing to listen to the argument against it."The conimon law, as so judicially declared, upon the right of picketing was
not satisfactory either to employers or to organized labor. The
employers denied the legality of 'the right even in limited forn;
"Chicago Typothetac v. Franklin Union, (not reported, but affirmed
in v2o Ill. 355) where Judge Smith said; "It is idle to talk bf picketing
for lawful purposes. Men do not- form picket lines for the purpose of
conversation and lawful persuasion.

.

.

. In imagination and in theory

a peaceable picket line may he possible, but in fact a picket line is never

peaceable. It is always a formation of actual warfare and quite inconsistent with everything not related to force and violence. Its use is a
form of unlawful coercion."
In Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v.Gee. (i9o5) zj9 Fed. 582, Judge McPherson said: "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing,
any
more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching."
2z4"
Cyc. 83 Notes 76 and 77 and numerous cases there cited. Sec
(1917) 5 Mont.N.
zo7;
White
also Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke,
57.
Ati.
398,Pac. 10.
H. i6j
78 183,
(917) To1
Murphy,
Mountain Freezer Co.
anti-injunctio,
upon
based
are
picketing
of
favor
in
Many late decisions
statutes. See, for example; Truax v.Iisbee Local, (1918) 19 Ani. 3n9.

171 Pac. 121,
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while organized labor not only contended for tile right itself hut
denied the legaility of any limitations whatever ulxn the exercise
of tle right. Both sought to establish their contentions by legisIation direct and indirect. Neither succeeded!'
Long before the right of picketing had become judicially determined, organized labor had adoplted still another weapon sonic""An Act defining picketing, prohibiting the same, and providing a
pecnalty for thle violation thereof"-enacted by the Legislature of thle
state of Washington and published ais Chapter t r session Laws of WVashington, 1915, may be taken as illustrative of the direct efforts of employers to establish by statute the illegality of picketing,
Organized labr smght indirectly to establish an unlimited right of
picketing throngh gtatutes such as the Clayton Act of Oct. 15, 1914,
(S Stat. at L..cl. 1,3; 1 Fed. St. Ann, gntil Ed. p.730) prohibiting the
issuance of injnctions to prevent any person or pertans from "attending
at any place where such persons may lawfully lbe. . . for the purpose of peacefully petsnading any person to vork or to abstain from
working; or front ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute, or from recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful anti lawful means so to do;" etc. etc. Similar statutes vere enacted
in many of the states, typical among which are Chapter 493, Session
l.aws of Minneso ta, q'y, and Paragraph 1464 of the Revised Statutes oi
Arizona of Utt3 (Civil Code),
' Te Washingtin Act prohibiting picketing (l.aws pi15 'h, .8t)
was defeated on referendum in 1pi6,
The Clayton Act prohibiting injunctions against picketing (38 Stat.
at L, 738, c2. 33, sec. 20) Was shorn of its supposed favoritism to organized labor by the Supreme Court of the United States in American Steel
C. R.72,
Foundries v.Tr-City Central Trades Council cl. al, (1921) 4 S.,
sustaining the right of federal equity courts to issue injunctions against
picketing in any way inditilng a militant purpose inconsistent with hare
peaceable persuasion, or interfering with free ingress to and egress from
tile
employer's premises; and in that particular case prohibiting the employees from maintaining more than one single picket at each point of
ingress and egress in the plant there involvd--establishing the doctrine
that "the purpose should be to prevent the inevitable intimidation of
Ii. e. caused bIyl the presence of groups of pickets, but to allow mission.aries."

The Arizona statute prohibiting injunctions against picketing (Revised Statutes Arizona 1913, Par. 1464), after being interpreted as absolute in its terms by the supreme court of Arizona (30 Ariz. 70, 176 Pac.
;7o) was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Truax v, Corrigan, 09) 43 S. C. R. 124, although there was
a strong and very able dissenting opinion by justice Brandeis in which
Justices Holmes, Clarke and Pitney concurred. This decision appears to
have sounded the death knell of state statutes designed to favor employees'
as a class immune from general provisions of law applicable to all others
tinder similar circumstances.
The Minnesota statute (Ch. 493 Session Laws of Minnesota (1917)
met with the same fate as the Clayton Act in the Wonderland Theatre
Case (Campblell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (Minn.
tofl) i86 N. W. 78t, 787).
It may safely he said, therefore, that the combatants (employers and
employees) are now practically back where they started in their fight to
legalize or outlaw picketing bi legislation.,
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what related to picketing-the boycott" The terms "boycott" and
"conspiracy" have been loosely used interchangeably in relation
to attempts by organized labor to force its will upon'employers by
concerted but usually inlirect action tending to injure or destroy
the trade or business of such emphiyers unless the demands made
of them should be complied with. There can be no doubt that
boycotting was originally illegal at common law;' but after early
decisions to that effect a wail of protest from organized labor, and
a plethora of new statutes in the several states (some for and
some against boycotting), soon brought about a change in judicial
sentiment and interpretation in most jurisdictions whereby the
boycott (as used by labor unions) was legalized within strict limitations," dependent upon the object to be accomplished and the
means of attainment. This test of the le~tlity of boycotting
(equally unsatisfactory to both combatants) gave rise to a somewhat artificial classification of boycotts as primary and secondary.
A boycott is primary where an organized union of employees by
concerted action cease dealing, either socially or in a business way,
with a former employer; and it is secondary where such employees
"The term "loycott" was probably used first in Slate v. Glidden,
(1866) 55 Con. 46, 8 AtI. 89o, 3 A. S. R. 23, which was a criminal prose-

cution for violation by'members of a labor union of a statute (Session
Laws of Connecticut, I878, ch. 92) unquestionably enacted at the behest
of employers (see decision, p. 69) and providing that "every person who
shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any person, to compel such
person, against his will, to do or abstain from doing any act which such.
person has a legal right to (o, or shall persistently follow such person in
a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to injure his property, with in,
tent to intimidate him, shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail six
months."

,"Doremus v. Hennessy, (898) 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924; 'Beck v. Railway Teamsters Union, (:&S) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N,'W. 3; Gray Y. Building Trades Council, (9o3) gi Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663, i18; Hopkins v.
Oxley Stave Co.,'(1897) 8, Fed. 912; 'Martin v. McFall, (19o3) 65 N. J.
Eq. 91, 55 At!. 465; Purvis v. Carpenters Local, (igo6) 214 Pa. 348, 63
Ati. 585; Jensen v. Cooks Union, (i9os) 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. io69.
In the Oxley Stave Company case, supra, Judge Thayer said: "While
the courts have invariably.upheld the rights of individuals to form labor
organizations for the protection of 'the interests of the laboring classes,
yet they have generally condemned those combinations usually
termed boycotts,' which are formed for the purpose of interfering, otherwise than by lawful conipetition, with the business affairs of others, and
depriving them by means of threats and intimidation, of the right to conduct the business in which they happen to be epgaged, according to the
dictates of their own judgments."
"in Gill Engraving Company v. Doerr, (1914) 214 Fed. Rqp. it,
Justice Hough, aftei denying an injunction to enforce aft employers
statute against boycotting (Consol. Laws, c. 40, New York), said: "Nor
does it advance matters to call the affair a boycott, for 'it cannot he said
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induce or compel others (not parties to the controversy) to withdraw their social intercourse or business patronage from a former
employer by threatening or doing injury to such other persons.
A great contrariety of judicial opinion arose as to what constitutes a legal or illegal boycott; some courts adhering to the original rule that all bhocotts are illegal,' some adopting the view
that primary boycotts are legal and secondary boycotts illegal,"
and others adopting the doctrine that boycotts (whether primary

or secondary) are legal if free of malevolence or violence anld
used in support of a bona fide industrial conflict, but otherwise illegalf Some of these conflicting decisions rested upon various
anti-trust anti anti-conspiracy acts-the former having been ju(icially stretched to cover combinations of labor as well as capital,

and the latter having been enacted (probably through the influence
that to boycott is to offend the law.' Mills v. U. S. Printing Company,
(19o4) 99 App. Div. 6u, 91 N. Y. S. I8s, affirmed (ip9o) in :99 N. Y.
76 92 N. E. 234. This is not thought to mean that every form of boycotting is lawful, hut that the word does not necessarily import illegality.
I do not perceive any distinction upon which a legal difference of treatment should he based between a lockout, a strike, and a boycott. They
often look very unlike, but this litigation illustrates their basic identity.
All are voluntary abstentions from acts which normal persons usually
perform for mutual benefit; in all the reason for such abstention is a
determination to conquer and attain desire by proving that the endurance
of the attack will outlast the resistance of the defense; and for all the law
of New York provides the same test, viz., to inquire into the legality (:)
of the object in view, and (a) of the means of attainment. When courts
generally (with some legislative assistance frpm behind) abandoned the
doctrine that any concerted arrangement which hindered, the following
of a trade or constituted an attempt to change trade conditions (especial.
ly wages) amounted to an actionable conspiracy, this judicial position was
quite sore to follow, unless it was admitted that the passing of the old
doctrine had left the matter political rather than judicial. This has not
yet heen done."
See also Pierce v. Stablemcn's Union, (199o)
156 Cal. 70, 1o3 Pac.
324; Lindsay v. Montana Federation, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 327.
'Wilson v. Hey, (z9o8) 232 I1. 389, 83 N. E. p28; Beck v. Railway
Teamsters' Union, (:898) x:8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 3; Gray v. Building
Trades Council, (90o3) 9i Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663, u118; Booth v. Burgess, (19oo) 72 N. . Eq. 181, 65 Al. 226; Purvis v. Carpenters' Local,
(1906) 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl, 585; Patch v, Protection Lodge, (I9O4) 77 Vt.
294, 6o Atl. 74; Crump v. Commonwealth, (1888) 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 62so
to A. S. R. 8%5; Burnham v. Dowd, (1914) 217 Mass., 351, 1o4 N. E. 841;
My Maryland Lodge'No, z86 of Machinists v. Adt, (9o5) zoo Md. 238,
59 At. 721,
"Foster v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, (902) 78 N. Y. 860, 39 Misc. Rep.
48; Butterick Co. v. Typographical Union, (zoo) too N. Y. S. 2332, 5o
Misc. Rep. I; Gill Co. v. Doerr, (1914) 214 Fed. Ili; Empire Theatre
Co. v. Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. io7; Ex parte Sweitzer,
(191
13 Okla. Cr. x54, j62 Pac. 3334.
VBossert v. Dhuy, (1917) 221 N. Y. 342, 137 N. E. 582; Stoner v.

Robert, (Q915) 43 Wash. L. Rep. 437; Parkinson v. Building Trades
Council, (ipog) 354Cal. 58j, 98 Pac. 3o27.
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of employers) to restrict the use of tile boycott in industrial disputes although never expressly so declaring.
But organized labor very soon exerted political pressure to
procure enactment of statutes declaring that labor is not a coinmodity or article of conunerce (and, consequently, not within the
pfurview of anti-trust or anti-monopoly statutes or decisions), and
expressly providing-as organized labor believed-that injunctions
should never be issued to prevent picketing or boycotting in conbats between employers and employees, nor to prolhibit any other
development in such struggles unless necessary to prevent irreparable injuryf" It was the confident belief of organized labor that
these statutes effectually removed all practical restrictions upon
their use of the xoycott and its adjiunct-picketing. This delusion
was short-lived ; and any prospect of final achievement of such results now seems to have been completely shattered by the Supreme
Court of the United States invery recent decisions.
In the Duplex Prinling Case" it was held that the secondary
boycott when so applied as adversely to affect interstate commerce
violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; that the Clayton Act gives
private parties so injured the right to relief by injunction inthe
federal courts; a1nd that the anti-injunction sections of the Clayton
Act cover only direct disputes between employers and employees
-hence

apply only to primary boycotts lawfully conducted. In the

.lnerican Steel Foundries Case," a similar interpretation of the
Clayton Act was adopted with reference to picketing; and even
the common law right of picketing was declared to be very limited
indeed, it being said that the ain should he "to prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of groups of pickets, but to
allow, missionaries." And finally, in the Truax Case" it was held
chat the anti-injunctiun statute of Arizona, when interpreted by
the highest court of that state as prohibiting the granting of an
injunciion against acts by striking employees which would be enjoined if committed by persons other than employees, is unconstitutional in that it violates the fourteenth amendment to the con"lThe Clayton Act, 38 Stat. at I.- 78. identical with Session Laws
Minnesota 1917, cl. 493, and similar to Civil Code Arizona xmu, Par.
1464 and California Statutes go3, page aS (Penal Code, Deering Ed.
1909, p. 762).
Similar acts were passed in nearly all
the states.
4,Duplex Printing Lress Co. v. Deering et at., (192 ) 254 U. S.443.
"American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tr-City Centray Trades Council,
(392a).42 S.C. R.72.
"Truax v. Corriman, (1921) 42 S.C. . 124.
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stitution of the United States guaranteeing to all the equal protection of the laws.
These sweeping federal decisions were followed by the supreme
court of Minnesota in the Wonderland Theatre Case'"
in, preting
a Minnesota statute identical with the Clayton Act.' Th most of
the other states will follow with like decisions is almost
tain, not
only because of the desirability of uniformity stressed ; the Minnesota decision but also because any other interpretation would

probably conflict with the constitution of the United States as interpreted in the Truax Case,
As soon as it had been established through the development
of American law governing the conduct of employers and employees in trade and labor disputes that employees could lawfully
organize and act in concert, the radical elements of organized
labor began to'chafe under the restrictions and limitations which
the law placed upon such concerted action, The decision in the
Danbury Hatter's Cases declaring a combination of labor organizations subject to the inhibitions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
and its members liable in threefold damages for violation thereof,
and the alacrity with which equity courts adopted the use of tle
injunction to prevent abuses where prospective actions at law for

damages gave no promise of adequate relief, together aroused such
bitterness that the more important rights of the parties were for
a time overshadowed by this phase of the contest." The result
was a split inthe ranks of union labor and the growth of hybrid
offshoots"--the bastard progeny of a hapless forbear-which afforded a fertile field for the evil work of anarchists and criminal
propagandists masquerading as friends of labor. The success of
these advocates of "direct action" and the crimes committed by
them in the name of uiton labor (but without its approval) led to
"Campbell %-.
Motion Picture Operators Union, (Minu. 192) 186 N.
781.
'"Session Laws of Minnesota for 1917, Ch.493.
*Loewe v.Lawlor, (1907) 2o8 U. S,274, 52 .L. Ed. 488, 28 S.C. R,
3o; Lawlor v.Loewe, (1915) 235U. S. M, 59 L, Ed..341, 35 S.C.P. 17o,
'Ina dissenting opinion in Truax v.Corrigan, (:9*i) 42 S; C.R.124,
138, Justice Brandeis said: "In America the injunction did not secure ree.
ognition as a possible remedy until :888, When a few years laiter its use
became extensive and conspicuous, the twntroversy over the remedy
overshadowed in bitterness the question of the relative substantive rights
of the parties." This bitterness, however, was caused quite as much by
the decisimi in the Danbury Hatters' Case as by the too ready use of the
injunction.
"Such, for instance, as the so-called Industrial Workers of the World
and other insincee exponents of "The One Big Union" idea.
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the enactment of statutes in various states creating, defining, and
providing for drastic punishment of the new offense of criminal
syndicalism:
And here rests the development of the relative legal rights of
employers and employees in trade and labor disputes.
The combatants face, each other in legalized battle array.
Fighting is the order of the day. Peace and quiet prevail only
between the rounds. The legalized weapons of employers are suppression of industry and derangement of commerce, lockouts,
blacklists, discrimination agreements, and starvation of employees.
The legalized weapons of employees are suppression of industry
and derangement of commerce, blacklists, discrimination agreements, strikes and boycotts. There are. forty-eight different sets
of rules for intrastate battles but only one set for interstate confiicts, The legislatures are the rule-makers; the courts are the
referees; and the "big stick" is the injunction. But it is not a contest of sportsmanship, but a dirty fight to the death where each
gladiator strikes the other below the belt whenever he can conceal
the foul blow, and at pleasure tramples under foot the spectators
who are paying nearly all the costs of the fight and eventually
will cntribute the purse for the winner and the consolation prize
for the loser. There is no arena and there are no sidelines
for the safety ot the onlookers who, perforce, are interested in
the outcome. All of this broad land-the land of the free and the
"Session Laws of Minnesota, 1917, ch. aiS, the first section of which
is as follows:
"Criminal syndicalism is hereby defined as. the doctrine which advo-cates crime, sabotage (this word as used in this bill meaning malicions
damage or jijry to the Property of an employer by an employe),, violence
.or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political ends. The advocacy of such doctrine, whether by
word of mouth or writing, is a felony punishable as in this act otherwise
provided."
This Act was held constitutional in State v.Moilen, (198) 14o Miun.
sxx,07,N. W. 345, where Chief Justice Brown said:
"The contention that the statute violates rights granted and secured
by the federal constitution is without merit. The design and purpose of
the legislature in the enactment of the statute was the suppression of
what was deemed by the lawmakers a growing menace to law and order
in the state, arising from the practice of sabotage and other unlawful
methods of terrorism employed by certain laborers in furtherance of industrial ends and in adjustment of alleged grievances against employers.
. ...,That they are unlawful and within the restrictive power of
the gislature is clear."
Similar statutes have been passed in many other states. In the,
state of Washington, criminal syndicalism is given a more restricted
definition, but sabotage is made a separate crime. See Session Laws of
Washington, igig, ch. x73 and 174.

OUTLOOK IN IADUSTRlte

DISPUTES

home of the brave-is the battle ground of the combatants. There
is no place of retreat for noncombatants-for women and children. Many are forced into the conflict against their will to die
with the vanquished or survive with the victors; others are deprived of the necessities of life; and all remaining are left to sink
or swim in the maelstrom of business depression, curtailed production, artificially enhanced prices, and disordered channels of trade
and commerce that inevitably result from the very nature of the
conflict.
That such conditions will remain static is unthinkable. For it
must soon be more clearly realized that the existing status is the
natural result of unscientific legislation and economically unsound
judicial opinion. The public detriment resulting from physical
combat between individuals has been recognized and made unlawful ever since "trial by battle" disappeared from Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence; and yet the same primitive fallacy has been deliberately adopted by legislatures' and courts" as the means whereby employers and employees shall determine their disputes in economic conflicts that indirectly but no less surely accomplish the
destruction or disability of the combat-.ts themselves, and occasion vastly greater and infinitely more iar-reaching public detriment.
An outbreak of mob violence or other physical combat between
contending forces it Pennsylvania would scarcely affect the citizens of Minnesota, but as this article is written (April, 1922) a
strike of coal miners in Pennsylvania gives direful promise of
leaving the poor in Minnesota and the Dakotas as well as in Pennsylvania to freeze during the next succeeding winter; and, even if
they be spared that calamity, at least a further shrinkage in their
already too thin purses will assuredly follow the enhanced pjices
for fuel that inexorably results from curtailment of normal pro"In the Report of the Congressional Committee on Industrial Relations, 1015, p. 136, appears the following:
"There are apparently only two lines of action possible: First, to
restrict the rights and powers of employers to correspond in substance to

the powers and rights now allowed to trade unions, and, second, to re-

move all restrictions which now prevent the freedom of action of both
parties to industrial disputes, retaining only the ordinary civil and criminal restraints for the preservation of life, property, and the public peace.
The first method has been tried and failed absolutely. . . . The only
method, therefore, seems to be the removal of all restrictions upon both

parties, thus legalizing the strike, the lockout, the boycott, the blacklist,
the bringing in of strike breakers, and peaceful picketing."
"Bosseit v. Dhuy, (1917) 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 58z, shows the extent to whieN permissible combat may now be carried.
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duction. But that is not all; for unlawful physical violence will
also surely occur in the vicinity of the mines if such strike long
endures. The history of strikes in general admits of no other
conclusion.
The reason for lawlessness in all long continued strikes is not
far to seek. The weapons of legally permissible use are woefullly
inadequate for tile achievement of complete victory by either of
tile combatants , hence, in the heat of conflict, both find the use
of illegal means preferable to a stalenmate or a failure. Human
passions are not easily controlled--especially when set in motion
with legal sanction. "Gentlemen's agreements" will be made behind closed doors and "sab cats" will 'prowl in the dark just as
long as strikes are allowed and tie ans of winning them are
prohibited by law.
But there is no disposition by either legislatures or courts to
add to the list of permissible weapons of tle combatants nor tot
extend their use. The tendency of recent legislation and decisions
has been quite Ito the contrary.
And this tendency will continue, because it is due to a realization by law-makers and courts (f tile intolerable consequences of
their mistaken policy of the past if it be continued to its logical end
in the future. It was too much for the supreme court of Minnesota in the J'oemdrland Theatre G sue when it caine face to face
with the logical result of its prev!ous decisions' and was forced
either tt utodi fy and restrict them or tt announce that tile erstwhile
employer in the II 'amlerlaud (asr might be boycotted and picketed
indefinitely because he chose persttally to do a certain job for
himself rather than hire two nunion men to doJt.' A statute coriThe
decision in the American Steel F'ondaries "(asc, (5921) 8. it

R. 72, upholding in theory the right (if peaceful picketing but limiting

the use of pickets to .,ie for "cach point of ingress and egress' in the
plant there involved, may Ie considertl by organized labor as a grit
paraphrase of that old doggerel jest:
"Mother, may I go out to 'wim?
Yes, yes, my darling daughter;

Hang yomr clothes on a hickory linh,

lint don't go near the water,"
:'Gray v. Btilding Trades Council, (t!oj) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W, 663,
;am8; Grant Co. v. St. Paul Trades Council, (t917) 116 Minn. z67, !6t
N W. j-=o; Steffes v. Mottion Picture Union, (1917) 36 Mint. oo 161
N. W. 24.
'In the statement of facts Ity the court in the Vonderland Case,
Campltell v. Motion Picture Machitw Operators Union, (Miu, 19221
t86 N. W. 781, ippears the following:
"Until Felruary 4., 1907, plaintiff employed tnnenut members of
I.ocald 21t to operate the projecting machines in 1this theatre. On Felt-
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responding to the Claytbn Act afforded a convenient and quite
sufficient excuse for following the Supreme Court of the United
States iin
its interpretation of that Act. But these decisions, state
and federal, are not to be deplored. On the contrary, they repre.sent a healthy cort to limit the effects of a mistaken policy previously adopted inl good faith, andI are the best that the courts can
do tinder present circumstances.
For it is now apparent to all careful observers that trade and
labor disputes between employers and employees cannot be settled
satisfactorily, as a rule, by combats between the disputants armed
with economic weapons the use of which must he so closely restricted in the public interest that neither combatant can effectually
subdue the other . And, paradoxical as it may seem, the ultimate

public good forbids that either be allowed to subdue the other;
for the result would lie either a workers' soviet on the one side or
a return to tile sweatshop (in the other. Either is intolerable."
This being so, why continue the fight? Why allow ten million
combatants to keep the home of a hundred million people in constant turmoil, to destroy their property, to imperil their safety, to
obstruct their sources of supply of the necessities of life, to interfere with their happiness and convenience in a thousand other
ways-all for the purpose of allowing the combatants the special

privilege" of injiuring hut never of completely destroying or subduing each other?
ruary 1, 1917, having decided to reduce his expenses, he gave to his
operators the notice called for by his contract with them for termination
of employment, and gave similar notice to the Loa . He informed them
that, to reduce espenses, lie was going to operate his machine himself for
the whole or a greater portion of the time, but was willing to employ a
member of the Local, at the wage scale fixed ly it, 'to relieve him a porlion of the time each day. The officers of the Local refused to enter
into the proposed arrangement. Plaintiff then offered to join the.Local,
hut was nht taken in because the rules did not allow an owner or proprietor of a theatre too become a member, On February 24, 1917, the employment of plaintiff's machine operators was terminated in accordance
wit the notice, and from and after that date until June 18, 1917, plaintiff
oiperated his machines himself, with part time aid from one Dillon, who
was not a member 4if Local 2a9.r it was upon such facts that plaintiff
was boycotted and picketed.
'The radical laborer's dream of life in a palace is hardly less attainaile than the aim of radical employers to "smash the labor unions". (See
any one of Judge Gary's after dinner speeches). Labor unions Wave come
to stay.. Their legitimate uses'are numerous and varied, not the least of
which is their inestimable service to the general public in curbing and exlosing malefactors of great wealth whose lawless greed would otherwise
add much to the burdens of life. A coal company declaring one thousand per cent. dividends is quite as reprehensible as a misguided labor
union striving to deprive a man of the privilege of doing his own work,
'The legalization of economic fights between employers and eniployces
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The best friends of organized labor on the bench are apparently
anxious for a change-for the substitution of some other method
of adjusting disputes between employers and employees."
Others high in authority have suggested a continuance of the
present struggle with experimentation in changing the rules of
combat as a possible solution of the problemf" It may be conceded
that experimentation is the key to progress in the development of
the law to fit the constantly changing conditions in modern society;
but fifty years of experimentation in armed economic conflict be:
tween employers and employees has been of doubtful benefit to
either of them, and has resulted in repeatedly dragging the public
despite the resultant injury to the general public constitutes in itself a
vicious special privilege. Other classes are generally required to submit
their disputes, of whatever nature, to some orderly tribunal or commission for determination and settlement-particularly where the public interests would otherwise suffer.
A blacklist in the hands of others than employers or employees meets
with severe condemnation of the courts, (Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Association v. United States, (1913) 2M U. S. 6o, 58 L. Ed. 490,
34 S. C. R. 95z) and is held criminal even when limited in circulation to
the members of an association.
A boycott maintained by any except employees or employers is unlawful (Davis v. Starrett, (9o3) 97 Me. 568,s55 All. 5x6).
Recognizini this evil in interpreting Section 2o of the Clayton Act,
the United States Supreme Court in the Duplex Printing Case said:
"Section o must be given full effect according to its terms as an expression of the purpose of Congress; but it must be borne in mind that the
section imposes an exceptional and extraordinary restriction upon the
equity powers of the courts of the United States, and upon the general
operation of the Anti-trust Laws,--a restriction in the nature of a stecial
priviege or immunty to a particular class, vith corresponding detriment
to the general public; and it would violate rules of statutory construction
having general application and far-reaching importance to enlarge that
special privilege by resorting to a loose construction of the section, not to
speak of ignorng or slighting the qualifying words that are foundn it,"
Justice Brandeis, the most profound stqdent of industrial disputes and
the most pronounced friend of organized labor on the bench, closed his
dissening opinion in favor of the unions involved in the Duplex Printing
Case with these words:
"Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law of
a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial
combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of selfinterest, I do not wish to be understood as attaching any'constitutional

or moral sanction to that right. All. rights are derived from the purposes

of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to the com-'
munity, The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions
exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest, and
to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function
of the legislature, which, while limiting individual and group rights of
ag~rcssion and defense, may substitute,,

processes of jutice for the nore

tial by comba'
pintive
method
Case, jJustice Hxolmes
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with the combatants to the brink of an abyss where disaster was
averted only by resort to subterfuges.-among which the Adamson
Act was the most conspicuous. A policy fraught with such
danger in indefensible. Experimentation, to be helpful, must be
made along sound lines; but this has not been done. The ap6logists for experimentation in the continuance of the economic war
between employers and employees attempt to justify their views
with the argument that it is all for the public good" The argument proves too much; for a fight to the finish would assuredly
destroy the public as well as the towmatants,*-and a lesser fight
said: "There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the fourteenth amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent
the making of social experiments that an Jmportant part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several statei,
even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and
to those whose judgment I most respect."
In-his dissenting opinion in the same case, Justice Brandeis, said: "The
rules governing the contest necessarily change from time to time. For
conditions change, and futrhermore, the rules evolved, being merely exeriments in government, must be discarded when they prove to be
"In his dissenting opiion in the Truax Case, Justice Brandeis said:

"The history of the rules governing contests between employer and .em-

ployed in the several English-speaking countries illustrates both the susceptibility of such rules to change and the variety of contemporary
opinion as to what rules will best serve the public interest. The divergence of opini in in this difficult field of governmental action should admonish us not to declare a rule arbitrary and unreasonable merely because we are convinced that it is fraught with danger to the public weal*
and thus to close the door to experiment within the law .. . In England
improvement of the condition of wvorkiugmen and their emancipation oap.
pear to have beep; deemed recently the paramount public need."

"It needs no argument td demonstrate that the removal of all restric-

tions upon employers allowing them to form a nation-wide combine could,
and in a great contest with organized labor would, result in the complete
cessation of all industry throughout the country. On the other hand, the
removal of all restrictions upon employees, allowfg them an unlimited
and nation-wide use of secondary boycotts'and sympathetic strikes, would
achieve exactly the same result And so the public would either perish
with the combatants, or become the prey of the victor--either the serf of
the malefactors of great wealth or the slave 'of soviet tyrants. The
United States Supreme Court foresaw one side of this proposition in the
Duplex Printing Case, where Justice Pitney in the majority opinion reversing the lower court and restricting the anti-injunction section of the
Clayton Act to primary boycotts, said:
"The extreme and harmful consequences of the construction adopted in
the court below are not to be ignored. The present case furnishes an apt
and convincing example. An ordinary controversy in a manufacturing
establishment, said to concern the terms or conditions of employment
there, has been held a sufficient occasion for imposing a general embargo
upon the products of the establishment and a nation-wide blockade of the,
chadinels of interstate commerce against them, carried out by inciting
sympathetic strikes and a secondary boycott against complainant's customers, to the great and incalcuable damage of many innocent people
far remote from any connection with or control over the otiginal and
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injures the public only in a lesser degree. In general, the conduct
of a just and free government must be predicated upon the principle of the greatest good to the largest number; and a departure
from this principle whereby a few of the people are allowed to inflict economic injury upon all the rest, for whatever purpose, is
surely of doubtful public benefit. If disarmament and the settlement of -differences by discussion and arbitration is a good policy
in the politics of the nations, the principle would seem to be equally
advantageous in the settlement of industrial disputes between em-a
ployers and employees. Common sense leads to the same conclusion; for the justice of a disputed wage scale can better be determined by disinterested arbiters than by an endurance contest letween the disputants--unless the public prefers the doctrine that
might makes right. A vague comprehension of the foregoing
,principles has already set the trend of the best thought of the times
toward industrial disarmament and arbitration, even though it
meets temporarily with the disapproval of organized labor."
It became evident that Congress and the several state legislatures had conic vaguely to realize the futility of armed economic
combat as a means of settling disputes between employers and employees when various acts were passed creating labor boards and
commissions with power to inquire into the facts in such disputes
and offer their services as mediators? But as these bodies were
not endowed with power to do more than offer their services and
suggest terms of adjustment to the disputants, the results achieved
were correspondingly meagre anid unsatisfactory. Enlargement of
their powers in determining disputes between public service corporations and their employees has doubtless resulted in some benefit, but has left much still remaining in the realm of uncertainty?"
actual dispute,-peopleconstituting, indeed, the general public upon whom
the cost must ultimately fall, and whose vital interest in unobstructed commerce constituted the prime and paramount concern of Congress in enact-

ing the Anti-tfust Laws, of which the section under consideration forms,
after all, a part."

"The
"
fear of organized labor that it may lie bargained out of its rights
in legislatures or courts of arbitration has little foundation. On the contrary their political influence seems to be more powerful than that of the
employers. See the Adamson Act, 39 Stat. L. 7a. upheld in Wilson v.
.
New, (1917) 243 U.S. 332 61 L, Ed. 755, 37 S,C.R. 29.
"The Minnesota State Board of Arbitration created in 1895 hy cualt
ter i7o Session Laws of Minnesota, J8Qs (R. L. 19o. sec. 1828 to i84: .
S.Minn. x913, sec. 3940 to 3946), and the Board of Mediation and Conciliation created by Act of Congress of July iS, 1913 (ch.6, 38 Stat. at L.
I
1o3) are typical.
"In sections 300 to 3j6'of the federal Transportation Act of February
8, 192o (41 Stat. L, 456 and 946) Congress created the Railroad Labor
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The boldest attempt yet made in the United States to substitute peaceful arbitration for industrial combat is to be found in'the
Kansas Industrial Court Act." The Kansas Act is the first clearcut modern recognition of the existence and rights of the third and
most important party to industrial disputes-the public. It is an
application of the fundamentally sound doctrine that all individual
rights are relative and not absolute-a doctrine long advanced in
favor of employers and employees and offered as an excuse for the
incidental harm done to the general public in trade and labor disputes, but now turned "t'otler end to" and applied in favor of the
general public and against employers and employees in Kansas.
The Act impresses with a public interest the production and distribution of food, clothing and fuel; provides that controversies
between employers and employees engaged in such production or
distribution shall be adjudicated by the court of industrial relations therein created, saving certain constitutional rights to the
disputants; prohibits strikes and other acts lessening normal production and distribution thereof; and adequately. provides for enforcement of this new law. The Act is prdicated upon the paramount interest of all the people as opposed to the oppression of
contesting groups in strategic economic positions, whether such'
oppression be direct or indirect. It is not a law against or in favor
of employers or employees, but a law enacted wholly for the benefit of the non-combatants--the general public. Indeed, in its
broader sphere of operation the powers and duties of the Kansas
Industrial Court are roughly analogous to those of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in the domain of national transportation.
The Kansas Iidustrial Court Act is, therefore, a pioneer in AmeriBoard with power to hear and render decision upon certain disputes be-

tween interstate carriers and their employees; but the enforcement of such
decisions appears to be still a matter of conjecture,
'Laws of Kansas, Special Session 19o, chapter 29 held constitutional
so17
ikans
423, 191 Pac.
in its main provisions in State v. Howat, (g )
58$; and again in State v. Howat, (1921) 1o9 Kans. 176. 8 Pac. 586; and
again in Court of Industrial Relations v, Wolff Packing Company,
(iga) tog Kans. 62g,2o1 Pac. 418; and again in State v. Howat, (z92)
tog Kans. ?9 22 Pac. 72. In Howat et al. v.Kansas, (92) 42 S.C.
R. 277, decided March 13, igas, on appeal from the decisions in £07 Kan.
423 and 1o9 Kan. 376, the Supreme Court of the United States expressly
refused to pass upon the constitutionality of the Kansas Industrial Court
Act, hut sustained the convictions of appellants on other grounds. In
the opinion Chief justice Taft said:
"We are of opinion that in neither case is the Kansas Industrial Relations Act presented in such way as to permit us to pass upon those features which are attacked by the plaintiffs in error as violative of the constitution of the United States."
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can law, and it represents a local legislative opinion in favor of a
complete reversal of policy-the suppression of industrial combats
in the public.intercstinstead of their enlargement in the interest of
the com,batants. Naturally enough it has met with the opposition
of both employers and employees, but the tendency of this new
idea to spread is already indicated by bills for similar laws since
brought before the legislatures of Massachusetts and New York and
now contemplated in other states-anti-industrial-court planks in
political platforms as bait for votes to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Kansas idea was probably derived from legislation in the
British Dominions. As early as 1907 the right of employers or
employees engaged in industrial disputes in Canada to cause a cessation of industry by lockouts or strikes was temporarily withdrawn until after official investigation and report upon such controversy should have been made."
In Australia a confederation of states exists under a constitution modeled on the constitution of the United States of America
but expressly conferring on the Federal Parliament power to
make laws with respect to "conciliation and arbitration for the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond
the limits oi any one state." There, as here, all residuary powers
of legislation remained in the states. The Federal Parliament by
statute created'a "Court of Arbitration and Conciliation" for the
settlement of disputes'ls ween employers and employees extending
beyond the limits of one state," while the several states enacted
similar legislation for like intrastate disputes."" In general these
statutes forbade boycotting, picketing, the strike and the lockout;
use of the injunction to enforce compliance with the acts was expressly sanctioned, and violation thereof was also made punishable
by criminal 'proceedings. Along with these prohibitions, industrial arbitration through courts or administrative tribunals created
by the same acts was made compulsory, the "absolute" rights of
"Statutes of Canada, 6-7 Edward VII, chap. 2o, entitled: "An Act to

aid in the Prevention and Settlement of Strikes and Lockouts in Mines
and Industries connected with Public Utilities." See also 9-to Edward
VII c. 29; 8-9 George V. c. 27; io-it George V,c. 29; Rex. v. McGuire,
(xgo8) z6 Ontario Law Reports 522.
"The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1go4-!qg5
printed as Appendix A to Commonwealth Acts, 1914-1915.
"New South Wales: Industrial Arbitration Act, i912-i9g8, and Industrial Disputes Act of xpo 8. Queensland: Industrial Arbitration Act, z916,
New Zealand: Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, z9o8.
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both employers and employees being subordinated to the public
interests. Fifteen years of operation under these laws in Australia
seems to have demonstrated not only that such system is vastly
superior to. legalized industrial combat, but also that the abridgment of personal liberty necessary to make the new system effective has been quite harmlessr"

In America, the induction of any system for compulsory settlement of disputes between employers and employees inay meet
with serious obstructions in the nature of constitutional limitations.
The provisions against deprivation of fiberty or property "without
due process of lav," and against "involuntary servitude," and in
favor of "equal protection of'the laws," may be urged with much
force against the compulsory operation of industiies by employers
and employees or even -the submission of their economic disputes
to legal tribunals. But rising beside these constitutional restric-,
tions is the indefinable "police power" reserved to the states to
support just such legislation as will necessarily be involved in compulsory settlement of industrial disputes; while the power to regulate commerce between the states and with foreign nations still inheres, by express constitutional provision, in the federal government. Ultimately the two powers together may 1U found sufficient to sustain both state and federal action to compel submission

of disputes between employers and employees to duly constituted
tribunals for adjudication without the cessation of, industry or
"In the third of a series of articles in the Harvard Law Review by
Henry B. Higgins, President of the Australian Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration,, itis said (34 Harvard Law Review, 126)'
"From our Australian Vpint of view, the objections so fieriely urged
in America and in Great Britain to conpulsory arbitration appear to be
fanciful and irrelevant. Conipulsion may be applied at either of two
points: compulsion to submit to arbitration before strike, and compulsion
to obey the award.. . . Under the Australian act,, both kinds of compulsion are applicable; and no voices, so far, as I know, are now raised
against either. Regulation by tribunals of soi ee sort is aceted; it is
welcomed epcay by the iaons-4he great majority of the unions....
The ideal ofthe Court is to get such a regulation as the parties ought to
put in a collective agreement; and compulion means merely that as to
claims on which the parties cannot agree, or as to which some of the
parties will not agree, thiCourt can make an award. Very often the
mere fact that the Court has a power of compulsion in reserve Impels the
parties' to find a line of agreement; and
e ers are more
willing to make concessions when the feel that their competitor are to
be bound by the same terms... . Moreover, . .'. the dread expressed
by certain theorists that compulsion would end In'a servile state'- state
in which the workers would be compelled to work in return for certain
guarantees
to conditions-is
far as our experience goes.
It
has been asestablished
herethatunfounded,
a worker so not
compelled to take wo,
work"
any more than an employer is compelled toisgive
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other economic disorders. The decisions upon the Kansas Industrial Court Act have already partially established the existence of
the necessary power; and the general trend of judicial opinion is in
the same direction."
"The right of the sovereign to enforce the operation of public
and quasi-public service utilities privately owned is already too
well established to admit of controversy; and the line of demarcation between public service and private enterprise is hazy as well
as flexible. All industry, all general trade and commerce betwken
human beings is necessarily impressed with a public interest of
greater or less degree; and well it may be that the courts of last
resort, under pressure of an enlightened public opinion, will finally
declare it to be exclusively for the legislatures to determine whether
any given industry so far affects the public weal as to justify enforced operation thereof and compulsory 'settlement of labor disputes arising therein. -Under such ruling of the courts, the incidental loss (if any) to the owner resulting from enforced operation in the public interest would be damnum absque injuria.
As to the employee, however, it is admittedly impossible constitutionally to enact any law specifically requiring him to work
against his will -,but there is no constitutional limitation upon that
economic law which compels him to work or starve. *Thathe has
no vested right in the special privilege of engaging in great industrial combats grossly inimical to the public welfare is clear; and if
deprived of such right by positive law and shorn of all privilege
down to his bare constitutional right of working or not working,
"In Wilson v. New, (917) 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S. C. 1t
28 which sustained the Adamson Law, Justice McReynolds in his dissenting opinion said:

"But considering the doctrine now affirmed by a majority of the court
as established, it follows as of course that Congress has power to fix a

maximum as well as a minimum wage for trainmen' to require compul
tory arbitrationof labor disputes which may seriously and directly jeopardise the movement of interstatetraffic; and to take measures effectively
to protect the free flow of such commerce against any combination,
whether of operatives, owners or strangers,"
In AmericanCoal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission
of Indiana, q2o) 268 Fed. 563, it is said in the syllabus:
"The regulation of the coal mining business is within the police power
of a state and in such regulation the state -an fr prices, which is a well
recognized mode of police regulation. The test to determine whether a
state law passed under its police power violates const. U. S. amend, 14
is whether there is no basisof fact on which to support the Legislature's
finding of public welfare, or when the remedy presented has no possible
conmection with the evil to be-cured."
The decision adverts to the New York and Wisconsin statutes regulating rentals, recently upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
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the economic law would soon deprive him of hii absolute right of
idling and bring him to a better realization of his economic duty
to the community which gives at least as much to any individual as
it takes from him, Analogous expedients to, force a waiver of
ultra-absolute constitutional rights of both employers and employees have been used effectively in the various Workmen's Compensation Acts."
And finally, if it be found absolutely necessary, constitutional
amendment to permit compulsory arbitration of disputes between
employers and employees is not impossible:'
From the foregoing study it appears that specially legalized
economic combat as a means of settling disputes between employers
and employees has been weighed- in the balance and found wanting;
that it is a mistaken policy based upon doctrines economically unsound and legally indefensible; and that it must be discarded in the
public interest and other methods invented and substituted in its
place, The signs of the times indicate a growing public comprehension that the proper settlement of industrial disputes lies neither
with a soviet of workers nor an oligarchy of employers, but;in a
complete reversal of policy-in the substitution of reason for"
force, of the modern processes of justice for the more primitive
-method of trial by battle, and of the might of the state to enforce
peace between industrial combatants for the paramount public
good.
And so mote it be.

"See the so-called elective provisions of the various Workmen's Compensation Acts whereby either an employer or an employee may stay

without or come within the operation of the law;. but he"is presumed to
have elected to come within the operation of the law unless he indicates
the contrary, and if he does so indicate, he is deprived of practically all

his non-vested rights relating to personal injuries unless the other also

expressly elects to stay without the law-in wich case the status of both
remains as though no compensation act existed,
"Various economists, including Professor Alvin Hansen of the University of Minnesota, have estimated that employers and employees together in all lines of human endeavor constitute about one-half the total
population. See Quarterly Publications of American Statistical Society,

December, 92o. Governor Allen of. Kansas estimates that in anylpartic-

ular controversy the proportions are: the public, ninety per cent.; employers and employees combined , ten per cent, Constitutional amendment, under such circumstances, is by no means an impossibility. Twenty

yeats ago many public men predicted that no further federal constitutional

amendments would ever be accomplished, Since then the federal constitution has been amended four times-to provide for-election of senators
by direct vote, the levy of an income tax, prohibition, and woman suffraFe. None of these amendments are more important than the matter

of industrial peace.

